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The South Carolina
Republican Presidential Primary:
Issue Advocacy Groups and Campaign Spending
William V. Moore
College of Charleston
Danielle Vinson
Furman University
The Federal Election Ca mp aign Act created restr ictions
for presidential
candidates
on the size of campaign contributions,
candidates'
personal campaign spending, and
spendi ng levels by candidates
and other groups . In
Buckley
v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court declared
limitations
on campaign spending
unconstitutional,
unless candidates accept federal matching funds . One result
has been the growing importance
of expenditures
and
campaig n activities by issue advocacy groups . This paper
describes
the important
co nsequ en ces of campaign finance reform and issue advocacy groups in the important
South Carolina R epublican Presidential
Primar y.
INTRODUCTION

istorically , presidential candidates depended on large
contrib utor s to finance their campaigns; however, the
costs of running a successful presidential campaign
have escalated because of the expanded use of communications. Congres s, in response to these spiraling costs and "fatcat" influenc e over campaigns, enacted the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. This act placed limits on the
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amount candidates could contribute to their own political campaigns, limited media activities, and required strict disclosure of
the campaign finance activities of candidates and political committees (Gierzynski 2000 , 42).
The campaign abuses that occurred during the 1972 presidential election by Richard Nixon ' s Committee to Re-elect the
President resulted in amendments to the FECA in 1974 designed
to limit the influence of money in elections. The Act limited the
size of contributions, limited the amount candidates could contribute to their own campaign, established a level of expenditures by candidates and other groups , and set up a system of
public funding for presidential candidates (Gierzynski 2000, 42).
During the presidential primaries, candidates could receive
matching funds if they adhered to expenditure limits. In 1976,
however , the U .S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo declared
unconstitutional many of the provisions involved with spending
limits. In particular , the Court said such limitations constituted a
violation of the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment (Buckley v. Valeo 1976). The provisions declared invalid
included those limiting expenditures by candidates, by groups
operating independent of candidates , and by candidates spending
their own money . The Court did uphold, however , limits on
contributions to presidential campaigns and limits on expenditures by those candidates who accepted public funds .
In 1979, Congress passed additional amendments to the FECA.
One amendment raised the minimum contributions and expenditures that had to be reported from $100 to $200. Another amendment permitted party committees to raise and spend an unlimited
amount of money on party building activities, such as registration
and getting out the vote (Wayne 2000, 34-35). This
soft money provision created a loophole that allowed the national
parties to raise and distribute enormous amounts of money to state
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and local parties. For example, in 1996, the National Democratic
Party reported soft money expenditures of $121.8 million while
the National Republican Party had soft money expenditures of
$149 .7 million (Wayne 2000, 46).
Issue advocacy groups have also become more involved in political campaigns. These groups are not limited in how much they
can spend independently for or against a candidate and there are
almost no regulations or requirements requiring them to report
how they paid for their advertising . As a result , issue advocacy
groups are becoming a much more significant part of the election
process as more money is channeled through interest groups instead of candidates. As long as these groups ' ads do not expressly
advocate a candidate's election or defeat, they are not subject to
donation limits . In fact, the Annenberg Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania estimated that one-third of the total dollars
spent on advertising in federal elections in 1996 was attributable
to issue advocacy efforts (Faucheux 1998, 18).
In 2000 , both federal funding for presidential campaigns and
issue advocacy groups played a role in Governor George W .
Bush's primary election victory in South Carolina . Bush chose to
finance his own primary election campaign and raised $60 million
in 1999. That combined with money the campaign raised in 2000,
resulted in a new record for most money raised by a presidential
candidate , more than $102 million. 1 Senator John McCain chose
to accept federal matching funds , a decision that limited his total
expenditures as well as his expenditures by state. In addit ion, numerous issue advocacy groups became involved in the South
Carolina primary campaign in support of Governor Bush. The
Bush financial resourc es coupled with the efforts of the issue ad-

'"Cam pai gn Spending Sc:ts New Reco rd ." New York Times on the Web . 6 Nove mber
2000.
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vocacy groups , resulted in a major victory for the Bush campaign
in South Carolina .
SOUTH CAROLINA:

THE SETTING

As in recent presidential elections, South Carolina was a crucial battleground for the Republican Party ' s presidential nomination . While New Hampshire has made a habit of deflating frontrunners , South Carolina has restored them to their original position.2 Since 1980, the state has supported every presidential frontrunner. In fact, South Carolina has been referred to as the
"firewall ," since insurgents like Pat Buchanan and Pat Robertson
have seen their campaigns end with the South Carolina primary.
The South Carolina Republican presidential primary is historically the first primary in the South, making it an important
barometer for candidates , the media , and political analysts of
southern Republican political preferences . In 2000, the state
took on added importanc e because of insurgent John McCain's
stunning 19 percentage-point victory over front-runner George
Bush in New Hampshire and because Senator McCain had targeted South Carolina as the second of four states essential to his
campaign - New Hamp shire , South Carolina , Michigan, and
Arizona. Mc Cain 's campaign believe d that if he won those four
contests , he could force Bush out of the race. 3
South Carolina has undergon e signific ant political change in
recent years. Immigration from the Northeast and Mid west has
chan ged the state's demo graphy , primarily in the Piedmont section and the retirement communities along the coast. In addition ,
in the 1990 s, $42 billion was invested in manufacturin g industries ,
lJim Varley and David Firestone. ·'Old-Line Republicans Find an Independen t Streak
Among the Voters," New York Times, 17 February 2000.
3
John Weaver, McCain Campaign Staff, telephone interview by David Magleby, 14
June 2000.
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creating 207 thousand new jobs. 4 This economic growth has been
a boom for the state's Republican party. In 1987, Republicans
held only 29 of 124 seats in the state house, while in 1994, the
party controlled a majority of the state house seats for the first
time since Reconstruction. In 1994, South Carolina also elected a
Republican governor for the third consecutive time. While the
Democratic Party regained the governor's position in 1998, the
state's Republican base is considered the strongest of any Deep
South state. Thus, South Carolina's presidential primary is considered an important barometer of Southern Republican sentiment.
THE CAN DIDATE CAMPAIGNS

John McCain's election strategy in South Carolina was designed to attract the newer Republican voters in the state along
with independent and Democratic voters, who could vote in the
state's open primary. In contrast, George W. Bush emphasized
conservative themes to energize the traditional economic and social conservatives in the state's Republican party. His strategy in
South Carolina was to build a wall between McCain and the social
conservatives. 5 Bush started his campaign with an appearance at
Bob Jones University, a Christian fundamentalist school in
Greenville that banned interracial dating and whose leaders had
once labeled the Catholic Church, a "Satanic Cult." 6 In a state
where the Christian Right is estimated to be one-third of the Republican voters, the Bush strategy, coupled with the efforts of issue advocacy groups, proved to be effective. 7

'Yarley and Firestone, op cir.
' Warren Tompkins, telephone interview by Danielle Vinson, 19 June 2000.
0
Glen Johnson, "Bush Regrets Bob Jones Appearance," 77ze (Columbia] Sare, 28 February
2000 , AI .
' Bob P:i.slay and James Hammond, "Upstate a Force in Bush Win," Greenville News, 21
February 2000. I A.
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In addition to McCain and Bush, Steve Forbes and Alan Keyes
were also active in South Carolina. Forbes campaigned in South
Carolina until February 9, 2000 . Following his loss in the Delaware primary on February 7, he abandoned his campaign after
spending $35 million ; Forbes' departure was so abrupt that his
commercials attacking Bush were still running on South Carolina
television and radio stations after his withdrawal from the race. 8
The two front-runners ran positive campaigns in South Carolina through January 2000 . McCain's victory in New Hampshire,
however , quickly •changed the tenor of the South Carolina race.
Both candidates aired negative ads on radio and television , and
their campaigns accused each other of using negative push polls
to sway voters. Both trotted out high profile members of the South
Carolina Republican party to appear at campaign events , to record
ads and phone messages to voters, and to sign their names to campaign literature . Bush had the support of former Republican Governor Carroll Campbell, Senator Strom Thurmond, Attorney General Charlie Condon, several local congressional representatives,
and numerous state legislators, including the speaker of the South
Carolina House of Representatives. McCain received active support from Congressional Representatives Lindsey Graham and
Mark Sanford and some members of the state legislature , including the speaker pro tempore . Though many perceived Bush as the
national party establishment candidate , McCain was able to make
inroads into the state party . These divisions contributed to some of
the rancor of the campaign .
In addition to the very visible airwave war, with advertising
and appearances designed to attract the media, the maj or candidates mounted an extensive ground war to increase their support
through phone banks and mailings. At least 21 different phone
sRichard L. B~rke, "Forbes Exiis and the Contenders Rush In," New York TimeJ, IO February 2000.
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messages were sent out by the candidates' campaigns, most of
them during the final two weeks of the primary battle.
The Bush calls included a canvassing ad "Would you support
Bush?," a call inviting voters to meet Bush, and at least two getout-the-vote calls. Bush's campaign also paid for recorded messages from Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), SC Attorney General Charlie Condon and former governor Carroll Campbell. The
campaign also paid for 45 to 50 thousand recorded get-out-thevote calls by Christian Coalition founder Pat Robertson. (Magleby
2000, 13). Bush's polling firm made at least 300 push poll calls
that included harsh "questions" about McCain without identifying
who was paying for the poll (Fineman and Isikoff 2000, 22). One
woman in Spartanburg, South Carolina said her son had taken a
call from a pollster who portrayed John McCain as a "cheat and a
liar and a fraud. " 9 Bush said he would fire anyone who had conducted a poll portraying McCain as a liar and fraud . Bush aides
released a script of one of their phone messages in which the
Senator Strom Thurmond said, "unfortunately the race has turned
ugly. John McCain has TV ads comparing Governor Bush to Bill
Clinton. There is no excuse for the negative ads." 10 Thurmond
called it sad and said it was the sort of message the people of the
country have rejected.
McCain had at least one persuasion call and two GOTV 11 calls.
His campaign also paid for calls that targeted Democrats. In one
of these, Democratic State Senator Phil Leven tis called "20,000 of
[his] closest friends" to ask them to vote for McCain. 12 People
who received this call and others like it claimed they had only
"Alison Mitchell wtth Frank Bruni, "Spotlight Tums on Ugly Side of Politicking," New
York Times , I I February 2000, A22.
'"Ibid.

''G ~t-Out-the-Vote.
1
is ou1h Carolina Stale Senator Phil Leventis, telephone interview by William Moore. 12
June 2000 .
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voted in Democratic primaries in the past and could not have been
on any Republican phone lists. Keyes also had one GOTV call.
Candidates bombarded targeted voters with mail. A network of
voters turned up 21 different mailings paid for by the Bush campaign and 31 pieces paid for by McCain. In addition, McCain sent
out at least 15 e-mail messages to active supporters and people
who had added their names to his subscription list. The Bush
campaign maintained an e-mail tree of more than 12 thousand
names of people who had provided their e-mail addresses to the
campaign. 13 The messages distributed across this network were
mostly campaign updates, press releases, candidates' schedules,
news articles about the campaign, and the campaign's response to
some of the news reports .
CANDIDATE CAMPAIGN SPENDING

Because of the importance placed on the South Carolina primary by the candidates and the media, the amount of money spent
on the Republican primary by the major candidates was inordinately high. While George Bush was not required to file a stateby-state report with the Federal Election Commission, Tucker Eskew, a representative for the Bush campaign, said Bush spent in
the neighborhood of $4 million in South Carolina. 14 Newsweek
and an anonymous Republican Party contact estimated that Bush
spent closer to $8 million in the state, 15 while one member of the
McCain campaign staff estimated that Bush spent between $10 to
15 million . 16 South Carolina state Democratic Chairman Dick
Harpootlian said, "George Bush spent $10 a vote or more, so it
13
Warren Tompkins, telephone interview by Danielle Vinson, 19 June 2000.
"Joseph Stroud, "South Carolina Saves Bush," TT,eStale, 20 February 2000, A 16.
,s"Back From the Brink," Newsweek , February 28, 2000. 24.
16
Trey Walker, McCain Fie.Id Campaign Director, tek phone interview by William Moore,
I3 June 2000.
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shows he does live by the Golden Rule: 'He who has the gold
rules. "' 17 McCain's report to the Federal Election Commission
listed his South Carolina's expenditures at $2,940,377 while Alan
Keyes spent approximately $280,662 and Steve Forbes, who did
not have to report his expenditures, spent $48,600 on advertising
in the state's four major media markets.
The largest expenditures went to media advertising. In the
major media markets-Columbia,
Charleston, Florence, and
Greenville-Bush only outspent McCain by approximately $170
thousand: Bush spent an estimated $1,681,554 to McCain's
$1,511,930. However, the timing of the advertising worked to
Bush's advantage. McCain started his advertising in 1999. While
this provided him with greater name recognition, it negatively
affected his campaign in the final week of the primary contest
since he had reached the maximum expenditures allowed in South
Carolina. McCain's Deputy Campaign Manager, Roy Fletcher,
said, "we had reached our spending cap and we couldn't fight
back." 18 McCain's field director, Trey Walker, said that even
though money was available, McCain refused to violate the
spending limits. 19 In contrast, the Bush campaign had bought so
much media advertising that Bush commercials were still running
in South Carolina the day after the primary.
Since the Bush campaign did not significantly outspend
McCain in the major media markets, the obvious question is how
the additional monies were allocated. Bush strategists, Warren
Tompkins and Heath Thompson, believed Bush spent more on
radio advertising than McCain. The Bush campaign wrote and
17

Schuyler Kropf, "Decisive Win Boosts Momentum," TTie[Charleston] Post and Courier,

:!OFebruary 2000. 14A.

'~Roy Fletcher. McCam Deputy Campaign Manager, News Forum on Issue Advocacy,
Na11onalPress Club. Wash111g
1on.D.C.; 17 July 2000.
"Trey Walker. McCain Field Campaign Director, telephone interview by William Moore,
13June 2000.
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produced these radio spots locally. They were harder edged, localized, and easy to target, especially when McCain went after
Democratic support. In addition, the volume of telephone calls
people received from the Bush campaign suggests that Bush also
devoted substantial resources to phone contacts. While Warren
Tompkins estimated that at least 1 million phone calls were made
by the Bush campaign, Heath Thompson estimated the figure to
be between 2.5 and 3 million. 20 Thompson said the campaign
started with volunteer phone banks in 21 counties; however, the
vast majority of calls during the last three weeks were paid calls.
They included recorded messages from various political figures.
THE INTEREST GROUP CAMPAIGNS

The candidate campaigns were supplemented by an intense,
personal, and negative issue advocacy campaign by interest
groups. Nearly three-fourths (74%) of the issue advocacy money
was spent attacking or supporting candidates; only 26% constituted pure issue advocacy. Virtually all of this activity attacked
John McCain . The interest groups used e-mail, fax, phone, mail,
newspaper ads, and radio and television communications. Some
have described what happened as "carpet bombing ," and state Republican Party Chairman Henry McMaster said the ground war
was "like flying over a jungle; you couldn ' t really tell what was
going on." 21
The interest groups involved included the National Right to
Life Committee (NRLC), South Carolina Citizens for Life, the
Christian Coalition, the Keep It Flying PAC, the National Smok-

20

Heath Thompson, Bush campaign staff, telephone interview by Danielle Vinson, 22 June
2000.
21
Henry McMaster, Chair. SC Republican Party , telephone interview by William Moore. 13
June 2000 .
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ers Alliance, several anti-immigration groups, the English Language PAC, and Capital Watch.
Just as the candidates adopted a negative tone in South Carolina, interest groups also shifted their themes and messages from
New Hampshire to South Carolina. The groups active against
McCain in New Hampshire shifted their theme and message in
South Carolina to a highly personal attack on McCain's character and his views on religious conservatism. Several of these
groups had criticized McCain months earlier. In September
1999, representatives of the NRLC had held a press conference
in South Carolina with representatives from the Christian Coalition, Americans for Tax Reform, and the National Rifle Association to criticize McCain's position on campaign finance reform.
On February 10, the NRLC and South Carolina Citizens for
Life threw their support behind Bush in press conferences in
South Carolina and Washington, D .C. This unusual endorsement
fractured relationships among some of the strongest abortion foes
in the state. Cyndi Mosteller, the leader of the Citizens for Life
Chapter in Charleston, called the endorsement inconsistent with
the group's policy of withholding endorsements when more than
one anti-abortion candidate is in the race. 22
Holly Gatling, Executive Director of South Carolina Citizens
for Life, stated the group's shift in strategy from New Hampshire
to South Carolina was the result of McCain's uncertainty over how
to answer a hypothetical question posed to him in New Hampshire
concerning what he would do if his teenage daughter wanted an
abortion. His statements convinced the pro-life groups that
McCain would not be strongly pro-life. McCain 's statements also
reinforced their concerns about his campaign finance reform pronMichd le Davis, "Abomon Foes Endorse Bush in the South Carolina Primary," 77,eState
10 February 2000, A8.
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posals. When it became clear after the New Hampshire primary
that the race was really between McCain and Bush, the groups
decided to endorse Bush to avoid any confusion on the part of the
voters about who the "real pro-life" candidate was. This coincided
well with the Bush campaign's decision to energize the religious
conservatives in the state.
One activity of the NRLC in South Carolina consisted of running ads, especially on Christian radio stations, throughout South
Carolina questioning McCain's pro-life record and commitment.
The ads talked about McCain's votes in favor of fetal-tissue research and his friendship with former Senator Warren Rudman
who is pro-choice. FEC figures show that the group spent $44,287
on radio ads. The FEC also reported that the NRLC gave $3 thousand to South Carolina Citizens for Life, which coordinated with
the national organization on the radio ads. The director of the
South Carolina organization said her group only spent $5 hundred
on the race; everything else was by the national group.
The national and state pro-life groups worked together to send
mailings to about 80 thousand households. The mailings encouraged voters to compare the candidates, citing Bush's pro-life position against Roe v. Wade and the use of "tax dollars to fund experiments that use body parts from aborted babies" in contrast to
McCain's conflicting statements and voting record on these issues. The mailing noted that in New Hampshire, "pro-choice Republicans overwhelmingly preferred McCain above all the other
candidates." The NRLC did one push poll phone call. The call
encouraged people to vote for Bush, saying McCain would not
reverse Roe v. Wade. It also claimed that Bush had maintained a
strong pro-life position and that he was endorsed by Henry Hyde.
The Christian Coalition was also involved in the anti-McCain
effort, reportedly targeting 140 thousand voters in the state. The
Christian Coalition of South Carolina sent out a card two days
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before the primary, entitled "10 disturbing facts about John
McCain." These "facts" targeted McCain's stands on abortion,
taxes, and other issues important to the Christian Right. For example, Fact 5 stated that "John McCain voted repeatedly in favor
of federal funding of experiments using tissue from aborted babies" and Fact 6 said "John McCain's economic plan would result
in the taxation of certain contributions to churches and charities."
The mailing claimed McCain said he might appoint Warren Rudman attorney general, quoting from Rudman's book: "The Republican Party is making a terrible mistake if it appears to ally
itself with the Christian Right." The mailing mentioned that
McCain was the only Republican candidate "who sought and received the endorsement of the Log Cabin Republicans, a prohomosexual rights group." Finally, the mailing raised concerns
about McCain's position on abortion and campaign finance reform.
The Christian Coalition of American also sent out a GOTV
card to select voters encouraging them to vote. Members were
also active in putting up signs, working phone banks, and going
door-to-door. On a Sunday talk show during the South Carolina
campaign, Pat Robertson made a veiled allusion to "some of those
other things that are in John McCain ' s background." Finally, as
previously noted, the Bush campaign distributed a recorded phone
message by Pat Robertson. Robertson's personal involvement illustrates the intensity of the anti-McCain sentiment within the
Christian Coalition and the religious right.
Other groups besides the pro-life and religious-right organizations were active in the campaign. The Keep It Flying PAC entered the campaign at the last minute. The group , which advocated
keeping the Confederate Flag flying above the South Carolina
capitol, sent out an estimated 80 to 250 thousand letters dated February 11, 2000 . The letter quoted McCain as saying "111e Confect-
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erate Flag is offensive in many, many ways. As we all !mow, it's a
symbol of racism and slavery ." However , the letter omitted the
rest of McCain 's statement that said he could "understand how
others might not feel that way" and mentioned his own relatives
who fought for the Confederacy. 23 The letter noted that of the
major candidates , only George Bush had refused to call the Confederate flag a racist symbol and it quoted Laura Bush as saying,
"It is not a symbol of racism." In addition to supporting Bush, the
letter attacked "liberal Democrats" in the state legislature, Governor Jim Hodges, the NAACP, Bill Clinton, and Al Gore . It included a "Keep the Flag! Dump Hodges!" bumper sticker and
asked contributions to pay for TV and radio ads. The McCain
campaign staff suggests the Bush campaign and the PAC might
have coordinated their efforts because the head of the group,
Richard Hines, is a friend of Bush strategist Warren Tompkins.
Tompkins denied any prior lmowledge of the PAC's activities. 24
The National Smokers Alliance also attacked McCain, in part
because of his sponsorship of an unsuccessful bill in 1998 that
would have increased tobacco taxes by more than $500 billion. 25
The Alliance spent $25 thousand on radio and television advertising to remind smokers and tobacco growers in South Carolina ,
a state where tobacco is the number one cash crop, of McCain's
record. 26
One other group opposing John McCain was the English Language PAC , which spent $7,075 on newspaper ads in two cities.
The ads claimed that McCain opposed English as the official language . They ended by saying "When John McCain asks for your

13

Dan Hoove r, " McCai n Bac ktrac ks on Flag ," Greenville News 11 January 2000, I 13.
WaiTen Tompkins , telephone interview by Danielle Vinson, 19 June 2000 .
25
Hoover, op. cit.
26
Michell e Davis , "The GO P Primary: Smo ke Gets in Your Eyes," The (Co lumbia] Stnte. 6
February 2000, 04 .
24
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vote, answer him, answer him in a language he understands:
'No!"'
The only identified group supporting McCain was Health Physicians for McCain. However, this turned out to be a front name
for the owner of a pawnshop in Columbia who was upset about
the attacks on McCain. 27 He bought $2,500 worth of commercials
on one television station in Columbia . Another individual, the
president of Carolina Solar Lighting , ran a full-page ad for two
days for his company that included a letter of support for McCain
and two pictures of McCain (one current and the other a 30-yearold military picture) in two major newspapers in the state. Although he claimed to have received a special rate for the ads, 28 an
estimate based on the cost of a full-page retail ad suggests that he
spent close to $24 thousand.
Anti-immigration groups constituted the major non-candidate
specific issue advocacy groups active in South Carolina. The
groups include Numbers USA.Com, Federation for American
Immigration Reform (FA.IR), Negative Population Growth,
Population Environment Balance, and American Immigration
Control Foundation . These groups did not endor se a candidate , but
told people to ask candidates about mass immigration. The groups
ran newspaper ads of approximately one-half a page in eleven
major dailies in South Carolina. Numbers USA , FAIR , and Negative Population Growth also ran radio and television ads and advertised on billboards across the state. In the major media markets, Numbers USA spent $34,500, FAIR $31,432, and Negative
Population Growth $49 ,192 on electronic advert ising.

" Trey Walker. McCain Field CJmpnign Director. telephone interview by William Moore,
13 June 2000.
28
Dan Russell. President 01 · Carolina Solar Lighting, telephone interview by Jenny Willis,
' March 2000.

VOL.2920

01

64

MOORE & VINSON

One other general issue group, Capital Watch , ran radio ads in
Charleston and Columbia asking candidates to sign a pledge not
to spend social security. Their expenses totaled $1,150.
Other campaign activity attacking McCain was undertaken individually . For example, Thomas Burch, chair of the National
Vietnam and Gulf War Veterans Coalition, joined Bush for a rally
in Sumter, South Carolina, and endorsed him. In the endorsement,
Burch maligned McCain's record on veterans' affairs. The next
day, five U.S. senators criticized Bush for the appearance and
voiced support for McCain 's record. A Bob Jones University professor sent an e-mail claiming that McCain had fathered two children out of wedlock and had a reputation for partying , drinking,
and womanizing. A Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas faxed a
flyer criticizing McCain 's "Fag Army" to South Carolina radio
stations, all .media outlets in Phoenix , Arizona , and all media outlets in Washington, D.C .29 World Magazine, sent out by God's
World Publishing Company in Asheville, North Carolina, also
attacked McCain . On election night itself, some people went so
far as to call radio talk shows and claim that a team of psychiatrists had determined that the Vietnamese had brainwashed
McCain and programmed him to destroy the Republican Party .
EFFECTIVENESS OF OUTSIDE SPENDING

Both campaigns agreed that the pro-life groups and the Christian Coalition were most effective, because they clearly presented
to their supporters that McCain was not a pro-life, religious conservative , and was even a threat to these things. Roberta Combs ,
the Executive Vice President of the Christian Coalition said after

1

9Westboro [Topeka. KS.] Baptist Church Representative. telephone interview by Anna
Nibley, 14 June 2000.
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the election, "I think we played a major role." 30 The decision by
NRLC and South Carolina Citizens for Life to endorse Bush prevented the religious conservatives from splitting their votes between Bush and Keyes, who was an attractive alternative for some
people. In an interesting twist, Keyes gave these groups more
credibility when he publicly declared in his speeches and debates
that he could not support McCain if McCain won the nomination
because of his views on abortion, thus corroborating what the prolife groups were saying.
The impact of other groups is less certain. Much as been made
about the late entry of the Keep It Flying PAC into the race. However, Warren Tompkins, a Bush strategist, questions the importance of the PAC's involvement "in the grand scheme of things"
for several reasons. First, the mailing by the group, while timed
with the presidential primary, actually attacked numerous officials
and groups in the state. In fact, McCain was not mentioned until
the bottom of the first page, and only eleven lines of the two-page
letter dealt with McCain or Bush. Second, though the letter did
include only part of McCain's statement, there had been much
news coverage of the subject in most of the major papers across
the state, and those articles had included McCain's positions and
his attempts to clarify the confusion on the issue. As Tompkins
points out, people to whom this was an important issue had plenty
of opportunities to read about McCain's positions in the newspaper or hear about them on television or radio, and they had probably already formed their opinions about the candidates. Also supporting this theory is the existence high profile pro-flag state legislators active in McCain's campaign.
The Keep It Flying letter did generate some response, though it
is not clear from whom. On election day, some people reported
30

"Christian Conservatives May Have Decided Win," 77ie (Columbia] State, 21 February

2000,AI0 .
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receiving a phone call warning that Bush was in favor of keeping
the flag on the capitol; the caller encouraged voters to support
McCain.
The issue advocacy groups, primarily the anti-immigration organizations, were visible during the campaign through their media
commercials, newspaper ads, and billboards. These groups, however, had little impact on public opinion in South Carolina, a state
that has a small immigrant population.
The National Smokers Alliance ad campaign complemented
the Bush campaign. In particular, the ads appeared while McCain
and Bush were debating tax cuts. These ads reinforced Bush's
message that he, not McCain, was the candidate for tax reform.
CONCLUSION

South Carolina became a critical state for George Bush following his defeat in the New Hampshire primary . In order to secure the state he effectively moved to the right. He successfully
courted the state 's religious conservatives starting with his appearance at Bob Jones University. He also vowed to keep the strict
pro-life plank in the GOP platform and he refused to meet with
the Log Cabin Republicans . He was assisted in his successful
campaign by several groups that attacked McCain in a variety of
ways . Dick Polman of Knight Ridder said that Bush won in South
Carolina "with extensive help from Ralph Reed, Pat Robertson
and other Christian activists who painted McCain as a hypocrite
with an immoral past." 31 Newsweek noted that local surrogates in
South Carolina accused McCain of various apostasies on abortion,
gambling, and taxes. It also cited the role played by Pat Robert-

31

Associated Press, "Exit Poll," Voter News Service. 19 l'ebruary 2000.
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son, Jerry Falwell, the National Smokers Alliance, Keep It Flying,
32
and pro-life forces.
The nasty and personal tenor of the South Carolina primary
was frequently mentioned in interviews with the campaign staffs
of both Bush and McCain. Bush pollster Jan Van Lohuizen saw
South Carolina as "personal, going both ways with veracity being
the issue." 33 John Weaver of the McCain campaign said he had
"never seen a more negative environment" than the 2000 South
Carolina Republican primary. 34 Richard Quinn , a South Carolina
consultant to McCain described the allied attack on McCain as a
"scorched earth strategy." 35 Trey Walker , another campaign consultant described the campaign as a "jailhouse rape,"36 while Ray
Fletcher said, "I've never seen anything like it and I come from
Louisiana. " 37
Exit polls show the effectiveness of the campaign by George
W. Bush and his surrogates. With the negative tone and the sheer
volume of voter contacts and ads, the contest generated extraordinary voter interest. Pre-election projections predicted that as many
as 400 thousand voters would tum out. 38 The actu al turnout was
565,704.39 In 2000 , over 100 thousand more voters went to the
polls than in 1996 and the 2000 voter turnout nearly doubl ed the
1992 turnout of 356,289 voters.
32'"Back From

the Brink," Newsweek, 28 February 2000 , 24.
Jan Van Lohuizen, President, Voter Consumer Research, telephone interview by David 8 .
Magleby and Jason Beal, 14 June 2000.
HJohn Weaver, telephone interview by David Magleby, 14 June 2000 .
35
R.ichardQuinn, McCain Campaign Com,ultant, telephone interview by Da, 1d 8. Magleby
and Jason Beal, 14 June 2000 .
3
"Trey Walker, McCain Fit:ld Campaign Director, telephone interview by William Moore,
13 June 2000.
" Roy Fletcher, News Forum on Issue Ai.lvocacy, National Press Club, Washington, D.C..
17 July 2000.
l8"Record Turnout Being Preuicted at Polls," Greenville News, 19 February 2000, I A.
39
Paslay and Hammond, op. cit.
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The single most important block of voters was religious conservatives. Of the voters in the primary 34% considered themselves to be part of the religious right and 67% of them voted for
Bush-only 10% voted for McCain . On abortion, 41 % of the voters felt it should be illegal in most cases; 17% said it should always be illegal. Fifty-eight and 66% of those, respectively, voted
for Bush.
John McCain's effort to attract independents and Democrats
was somewhat successful; however, the large turnout of core Republican voters doomed his effort. Exit polls showed that 79% of
Bush voters said they were Republicans while 62% of McCain
voters were not. 40
Ironically, the anti-McCain attacks by outside groups allowed
Bush to present an image of himself taking the high road in the
campaign. And, in fact, voters in South Carolina said that it was
McCain-not Bush-who had run the nastier campaign .~' While
the anti-McCain groups could not legally run a coordinated campaign , their attacks complemented Bush's successful campaign
strategy and helped propel him to a 13 percentage-point victory in
South Carolina. The victory in South Carolina provided Bush with
the momentum needed to win the Republican Party's nomination
for president in 2000. Contributing to his victory were federal
laws limiting John McCain ' s expenditures and allowing issue advocacy groups to campaign on George Bush's behalf .
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